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We compare different designs that have been used to test for an impact of time horizon on 
discounting, using real incentives and two representative data sets. With the most commonly 
used type of design we replicate the typical finding of declining (hyperbolic) discounting, but 
with other designs find constant or increasing discounting.  As a whole, the data are not 
consistent with any of these usual candidate discounting assumptions, and they also imply a 
violation of transitivity. The results have implications for interpreting previous evidence, and 
pose an important puzzle for understanding inter-temporal choice. 
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February 16, 2012 1 Introduction
Understanding inter-temporal decision making is crucial for economics, and choice exper-
iments have been an important tool in this undertaking. Early experiments in psychology
had a particularly important impact on economics. These showed that exogenously vary-
ing the time horizon aected inter-temporal choice, in a way consistent with declining
rather than constant discounting (for a survey see Frederick et al., 2002). This evidence
provided part of the motivation for new economic models incorporating hyperbolic, or
quasi-hyperbolic, discount functions (e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997;
O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), with important implications in terms of the possibility of
dynamic inconsistency and self-control problems. Similar choice experiments have also
been used by economists as a way to potentially measure the extent of self-control prob-
lems among dierent groups of people, or predict economic outcomes thought to be related
to self-control (e.g., Sutter et al., 2010; Meier and Sprenger, 2010).
Taking into account more recent evidence, however, it is less clear that time horizon
eects in experiments are in fact capturing the shape of an underlying discount function.
While initial studies did nd declining discounting, this was predominantly (though not
exclusively) using one type of design.1 Other studies using dierent but theoretically
equivalent designs have found constant discounting, increasing discounting, or some other
type of choice pattern, on average (e.g., Anderhub et al., 2001; Read, 2001; Read and
Roelofsma, 2003; Rubinstein, 2003; Read et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2005; Zauberman
et al., 2009; Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Benhabib et al., 2010; Andrioni and Sprenger, 2010;
Andersen et al., 2010; Takeuchi, 2010; Andersen et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2010; Halevy,
2011). Also, studies relating experimental measures of dynamic inconsistency to life out-
comes have found mixed results, and other mechanisms besides self-control problems could
possibly explain the relationships that are observed.2 Thus, it is not clear what discount-
1 Frederick et al. (2002) survey ten studies that compare discounting over overlapping time horizons
of dierent lengths (what we call an \overlapping design" below), and nd behavior consistent with
declining discounting. They also nd the same pattern comparing across roughly thirty studies that
use either short or long time horizons. By contrast, only four studies use a dierent design, involving
comparing non-overlapping time horizons of equal lengths (what we call a \shifted design" below),
and nd evidence that can be interpreted as declining discounting. Some of these latter studies also
have some unusual design features, which make comparison to subsequent experiments conducted by
economists more dicult.
2 In some cases studies have found no dierence in outcomes based on usual measures of dynamic incon-
sistency (Sutter et al., 2010), or mixed evidence depending on the outcome being studied (Meier and
1ing assumption is a good description of the evidence as a whole, or if any discounting
model explains the data. Resolving the controversy has been dicult, however, partly due
to dierences across studies in terms of the approach used to measure time horizon eects.
This paper provides new evidence on how time horizon aects inter-temporal choice,
in a design that compares multiple measurement approaches within the same framework.
This allows investigating whether seeming support for a given discounting assumption
varies systematically with the type of measure used. Also, we can look at the ability of
discounting models to explain the data from a more holistic point of view. Our design
is also powerful because it combines several other features. We use two relatively large
data sets, with 500, and 1,500 subjects respectively, each of which was drawn so as to
be representative of the adult population in Germany. The use of representative samples
helps establish whether time horizon eects are specic to certain segments of the pop-
ulation, such as students, or are more pervasive and thus more important. We use real
incentives, in contrast to some studies that use hypothetical incentives, and credibility of
our incentives is particularly high because subjects are in a long-term relationship with
the agency conducting the experiments. We vary stake sizes, and also method of payment
delivery, across dierent groups of subjects, which allows us to assess robustness to such
design variations. Finally, we have detailed information on life outcomes that are often
thought to reect self-control problems, allowing us to contribute evidence on how these
relate to experimental measures of time horizon eects.
We designed the experiment to explicitly compare three dierent approaches to test-
ing discounting assumptions. All of these build on the workhorse, \price-list" framework
that is the industry standard for economists: Subjects make a series of choices between
smaller, sooner and larger, later monetary rewards. The most commonly used approach,
which we denote the \overlapping design" (OD), involves measuring discounting over two
or more overlapping time horizons for the same individual, where all time horizons start
on the same date. For example, one of our OD measures involves comparing discount-
ing between the immediate future, denoted 0, and 6 months, to discounting between 0
Sprenger, 2008; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Burks et al., 2011) or gender of the subject (Ashraf et al.,
2006; Bauer et al., 2010). With a more parametric approach, Harrison et al. (2010) nd that smokers
and non-smokers are \no more or no less dynamically inconsistent than each other" (pp. 716). Chabris
et al. (2008) nd a relationship between discounting measures and outcomes, but using the level of the
discount rate rather than measures of sensitivity to time horizon.
2and 12 months.3 Studies using this design often nd a pattern consistent with declining
(hyperbolic) discounting (Frederick et al., 2002). Another approach, which we denote
the \shifted design" (SD), involves two non-overlapping time horizons of the same length,
where the start date of one time horizon is shifted forward in time. For example, one of
our SD measures compares discounting between 0 and 6 months to discounting between
6 months and 12 months. While the shifted design corresponds to the commonly cited
\apple" thought experiment by Thaler (1981), it has actually been less commonly used
than the overlapping design.4 Studies that implement this approach sometimes nd that
behavior is consistent with declining discounting (e.g., Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995, and
others), but in other cases nd constant or even increasing discounting (e.g, Anderhub et
al., 2001; Sutter et al., 2010). We also designed the experiment to allow what we call the
\overlapping, shifted design" (OSD). This involves comparing discounting over a long time
horizon to discounting over a shorter time horizon, which overlaps but is shifted forward so
as to start later in time. For example, we compare discounting between 0 and 12 months
to discounting between 6 months and 12 months. This latter approach was initially tried
by Baron (2000) and Read (2001), and yielded little support for declining discounting.
Importantly, all of these approaches to distinguishing between discounting models
rely on a set of maintained assumptions. If these assumptions do not hold, models typically
predict constant discounting behavior in the context of the experiments, regardless of the
shape of the discount function.5 In this case, however, there is still a testable prediction
for the broader class of models, namely that behavior should be in line with constant
discounting. We assess the ability of dierent models to explain the data, both with and
without the usual maintained assumptions.
The main stylized fact from our analysis is that time horizon matters for inter-
temporal choice, in a way that is hard to explain with standard discounting models: People
3 Use of 0 to denote the immediate payments is a slight abuse of notation, because payments were
never truly immediate; they arrived in the immediate future, typically two days from the date of the
experiment. We discuss the reasons for this (commonly used) front end delay feature of the design in
more detail below.
4 The thought experiment involves a choice between 1 apple today or 2 apples tomorrow, and between 1
apple in a year or 2 apples in a year and a day. Both choices are made today. Declining discounting can
explain why people might potentially choose 1 apple in the early horizon, but plan to choose 2 apples
in the later horizon.
5 For example, it has typically been assumed that people treat monetary payments as consumption. We
discuss why relaxing this assumption means that constant and non-constant discounting cannot be
distinguished, because both predict constant discounting behavior in the experiment context.
3are more impatient for short time horizons than longer time horizons, inconsistent with
constant discounting, but are relatively insensitive to when a given time horizon starts,
contrary to non-constant discounting. For example, people are more impatient from 0 to
6 months than 0 to 12 months, but similarly impatient for 6 to 12 months compared to 0
to 6 months. This pattern is also inconsistent with a broader class of models, in that it
implies a violation of transitivity.6 The same qualitative pattern is observed in our second
data set, despite using dierent parameters, time horizon lengths, and starting dates. The
pattern is also robust in that it holds for dierent sub-populations that we consider (by
gender, age, education, cognitive ability, and nancial situation). To make sure that the
aggregate patterns are representative of individual level behavior, rather than reecting
a misleading composition eect from heterogeneous types, we conduct individual-level
analysis. The modal choice pattern for individuals is exactly as observed at the aggregate
level, and only a few individuals can be classied as consistent with standard discounting
assumptions. In conservative robustness checks that allow for substantial \trembling hand
errors", the relative majority still violate transitivity.
A rst implication of the results is that there is an important puzzle for under-
standing inter-temporal choice. The types of experiments we conduct have traditionally
been a yardstick for assessing dierent modeling assumptions, as they involve incentivized
choices, and relatively simple inter-temporal trade-os. The observed sensitivity of dis-
counting to time horizon length has potentially profound implications for a wide range of
economic choices. Yet, discounting models, regardless of whether discounting is constant
or non-constant, have trouble fully explaining these eects. This points to an opportunity
to improve models of inter-temporal decision making, in a way that may prove useful both
in the context of experiments and also in the eld. We discuss some potential directions
for future theoretical work at the end of the paper.
A second main implication concerns the interpretation of previous empirical research
on time horizon eects. Our ndings oer a potentially useful lens through which to view
\mixed evidence" across previous studies: The particular method variance we observe
maps, broadly speaking, onto the patterns of inconsistent results. We reliably nd declin-
ing discounting with OD measures, similar to most previous studies using this approach,
6 See Roelofsma and Read (2000) for some of the rst evidence that inter-temporal choices can violate
transitivity.
4and less evidence for declining discounting using other types of measures, similar to many
(but not all) previous studies using SD or OSD approaches. Thus, the original focus on
OD designs in the literature may have contributed to the perception that declining dis-
counting could explain time horizon eects. Relatedly, our results raise questions about
how to interpret evidence from the many studies that use only one or perhaps two types
of time horizon comparisons. These may seem to support one particular discounting as-
sumption or another, when in fact a more comprehensive design might reveal pervasive
intransitivity and inconsistency with any standard discounting model. Another implica-
tion concerns the use of experimental measures to identify self-control problems. One
potential explanation for the mixed success of previous studies in predicting life outcomes
related to self-control could be attenuation bias: without a design involving multiple time
horizon comparisons, there may be a \biased" classication of discounting types, such
that many individuals who are classied as, say, constant discounters may in fact be in-
transitive. However, given our nding that the majority of time horizon eects cannot be
explained by non-constant discounting, an alternative explanation for the weak results is
that some other mechanism besides self-control problems drives time horizon eects. In
our concluding discussion, we report results on how our experimental measures relate to
life outcomes, using a specication that addresses attenuation bias, and conclude in favor
of the latter explanation.
Our results are complementary to another strand of the literature in psychology,
which has questioned whether time horizon eects reect discounting. Previous studies
(e.g., Barron, 2001; Read, 2001; Read and Roelofsma, 2003; Read et al., 2005; Zauberman
et al., 2009) found, as in our study, \subadditivity" of discounting on average, such that
discounting is more extreme when measured using sub-intervals.7 For the most part,
however, these studies have had hypothetical incentives, and have used college student
subjects.8 Our study is dierent in that we use representative samples of adults, combined
with incentivized experiments and highly credible payments. We consider the ability of
7 The tendency for people to be more impatient for both 0 to 6 months, and 6 to 12 months, than 0
to 12 months, implies subadditivity: The total discounting from compounding the discount factors for
the two sub-intervals is less than the discount factor obtained from the longer time horizon measure.
Maintaining usual assumptions of separability and time stationarity, additivity is a prediction of all
standard discounting models, regardless of the shape of the discount function.
8 Exceptions are Experiment 3 in Read (2001), where one of 20 student subjects was randomly selected
to be paid, and Roelofsma and Read (2005), where one of 2,000 participants in a (non-representative)
internet experiment was randomly selected to receive real money.
5various models to explain the behavior we observe, under dierent possible assumptions.
We are able to show a pervasive violation of discounting models and transitivity in the
general population, and show the robustness of this result across dierent sub-populations.
Finally, we relate the experimental measures to real economic outcomes.
The ndings of this paper also add to a literature in economics, on time discounting.
For example, Harrison et al. (2002) were the rst to study discounting experiments in a
representative sample, and Andersen et al. (2010; 2011) also do so.9 Dierent from our
study, both focus on OD type designs. Bisin et al. (2010) focus on OD comparisons in the
lab, and Andrioni and Sprenger (2010) use multiple types of time horizons in the lab, but
do not explicitly consider method variance or intransitivity. Our paper adds an important
additional dimension, showing how a design with multiple types of time horizon comparison
can deliver a quite dierent perspective on the nature of inter-temporal choice and ability
of various models to explain time horizon eects. Some recent studies have also deviated
from the typical approach of eliciting all choices, about the present and about the future,
at one point in time; returning to subjects multiple times, they test whether the pattern
of declining discounting implied by choices made in the initial interview actually translate
into the predicted direction of choice reversal (Harrison et al., 2005; Airoldi et al., 2011;
Halevy, 2011), and so far conclude in the negative. Our approach is complementary in
that it shows that even the initial choices are not consistent with discounting predictions,
and thus helps explain why returning to subjects in the future does not yield behavior
consistent with the predictions of discounting models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets,
treatments, and behavioral predictions. Section 3 presents the main results, and discusses
ability of dierent models to explain the stylized facts. Section 4 concludes with a discus-
sion of directions for future research, and potential implications for policy interventions
intended to target self-control problems.
9 Their approach is complementary and has dierent strengths. In particular, they use a more parametric
methodology, and additional experimental measures to calibrate concavity of utility.
62 Design of the Experiment
2.1 Data collection and experimental procedures
Our analysis uses two data sets. One data set, which we call the SOEP data, involves a
sub-sample of participants in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a large panel
data set for Germany (for a detailed description of the SOEP see Schupp and Wagner, 2002;
Wagner et al., 2007). The second data set is the SOEP Cross Sectional Study 2005, which
we call CSS data for short. This data set involves a separate sample of individuals, which
was collected by the SOEP administration as part of the annual process of \pretesting"
questions for potential use in the SOEP survey; the data set is just a cross-section rather
than a panel like the actual SOEP. The CSS data, and the SOEP data, were collected
during Spring of 2005, and Spring and Summer of 2006, respectively. Collection in each
case was done by the same professional surveying company that administers the SOEP
every year. Sampling for each data set was done according to the same procedure used
to generate the SOEP sample, and individuals were visited by interviewers in their own
homes.10 Both the CSS and SOEP samples were constructed so as to be representative
of the adult population, age 17 and older, living in Germany.11 In total the CSS data
include 500 subjects who participated in the inter-temporal choice experiments, and the
SOEP data include 1,503 such subjects.
Participants in our studies went through a computer assisted personal interview
(CAPI) conducted with a laptop. The interview consisted of two parts. First, subjects
answered a detailed questionnaire. The items in the questionnaire were presented in the
standard format used by the SOEP. Topics included demographic characteristics, nancial
situation, health, and attitudes. The questionnaire also included two brief tests of cognitive
ability. The full questionnaire, in German and translated into English, is available upon
request. At the end of the questionnaire, subjects were invited to participate in the second
part of the interview, which consisted of a paid experiment.
The rst step in the experimental procedure involved the experimenter presenting
10 For each of 179 randomly chosen primary sampling units (voting districts), an interviewer was given
a randomly chosen starting address. Starting at that specic local address, the interviewer contacted
every third household and had to motivate one adult person aged 17 or older to participate. For a
detailed discussion of the random walk method of sampling see Thompson (2006).
11 Respondents had to turn 18 during the year of the interview to be eligible.
7subjects with some example choices. The experimenter explained the types of choices
that the subject would make, and how payment would work. In particular, subjects were
informed that the experiment would involve multiple choices, that one choice situation
would be randomly selected after all choices had been made, and that the choice they
made in this situation would potentially be relevant for their payo. Subjects knew that
at the end of the experiment a random device would determine whether they were actually
paid, with the probability of being paid equal to 1/7 in the CSS, and 1/9 in the SOEP data.
This procedure gives subjects an incentive to choose according to their true preferences in
each choice situation, and thus is incentive compatible. After explaining the nature of the
experiment and the rules for payment, the experimenter asked subjects whether they were
willing to participate. Subjects who agreed to participate were given further instructions,
and then allowed to ask questions. Once there were no more questions, the experiment
began, and subjects were asked to make their actual choices. An example of the script
and instructions used in the experiments is presented in Appendix A.2 below, translated
from German into English.
Our experiments were designed to give a measure of the annual internal rate of return
(IRR) needed to induce an individual to wait, for a given time horizon. A time horizon
Tst is dened by starting date s, and ending date t. For a given horizon an individual
chose between an early payment, Xs, available at the start of the horizon, or a larger, later
payment, Zt, available at the end of the horizon. For example, in horizon T012, the early
payment is at time 0, and the later payment is 12 months in the future. In all choices
for a given horizon, the amount of Xs was held constant, but the later payment, Zt, was
larger in each subsequent choice. For most time horizons, the value of Zt in the rst choice
was calibrated to be consistent with an annual IRR of 2.5 percent, assuming semi-annual
compounding, and each subsequent value of Zt implied an additional 2.5 percentage point
increase in the annual rate of return, up to a maximum of 50 percent.12 In one treatment
we implemented choices with a coarser measurement of the IRR, in steps of 5 percentage
points, but allowed measuring annual IRRs as high as 100 percent. We obtain an incentive
compatible measure of impatience for a given time horizon by observing the value of Zt, or
12 We chose semi-annual compounding of the annual interest rate because this is a natural compromise
between the two types of compounding German subjects are most familiar with: quarterly compounding
on typical bank accounts, and annual reports on the rate of return from savings accounts, pension funds,
or stock holdings. Using semi-annual compounding also helps avoid prominent round numbers in the
choices, which could potentially inuence switching choices.
8equivalently the annual IRR, needed to induce the individual to wait. Actually, we obtain
upper and lower bounds for the annual IRR, separated by 2.5 percentage points, due to
the discrete variation in late payment amounts; in our analysis we focus on lower bounds.
Across treatments, we varied s and t, and the amounts Xs and Zt.
During the experiment subjects were presented with the dierent choices, one at a
time, on the computer screen. The rst time that a subject switched from the early to the
delayed payment, the subject was asked whether he or she also preferred to wait for any
larger payment. All subjects agreed, and as a consequence, there are no non-monotonic
choices in the data. It has been shown previously that multiple-switching between early
and late payment amounts is associated with lower cognitive ability (Burks et al., 2009);
our procedure was intended to help mitigate potential confusion among subjects about
the structure of the choice problem, and reduce frequency of non-monotonic choices, by
re-iterating the tendency for the late payment to only increase across further choices.13
Subjects knew that one row would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment,
and that their decision in that row could be relevant for their payo. Subjects also knew
that all payments would be sent by mail following the interview. For the CSS data set,
all payments were mailed on the day after the interview and thus would arrive within
at most two days due to the well-known two-day guarantee for delivery by the German
postal service.14 Certicates for immediate payments could be cashed immediately, once
they arrived, while certicates for payments in the future could only be cashed at the
specied time. For the SOEP data, payments were also sent by mail, but the timing of
the mailing reected the timing of the payments, i.e., immediate payments were mailed
immediately after the experiment and arrived within two days, while later payments were
mailed punctually on the corresponding later date. This variation in procedures provides
a potentially useful check on whether timing of payment deliveries matters for results, in
13 One concern with this type of procedure might be that it tends to \lock-in" mistakes, if subjects for
some reason tend to make a mistake the rst time they choose the later payment, and then do not want
to tell the experimenter that they have changed their mind. A similar concern would apply to a standard
\titration" procedure that is often used in inter-temporal choice experiments, where the choices oered
to subjects depend on past choices. Even if mistakes were locked-in, however, to the extent that this
aects all measures it should not matter for our conclusions, because they are based on dierences across
measures. Furthermore, we nd very similar results regardless of cognitive ability, suggesting that our
results are not driven by those who might be more prone to mistakes. Notably, studies that use some
other approach, and end up with more non-monotonic choices, are put in the position of either dropping
(non-randomly) a part of the data, or incorporating non-monotonic choices in an ad hoc way.
14 The Deutsche Post is highly successful at achieving an explicit goal to delivery mail within two days,
for packages with origin and destination within Germany.
9particular due to credibility issues.
In the literature on inter-temporal choice experiments, it is desirable to have equal
credibility of early and late payments, and our design has several features that arguably
achieve this goal as well or better than previous studies. Equal credibility is desirable in
order to prevent, e.g., that early payments enjoy relatively higher credibility, and thus
choices are distorted in the direction of overstating impatience, or even overstating the
degree of declining discounting.15 A rst feature of our design that addresses credibility
is the \front-end delay" (see Coller and Williams, 1999), in the sense that all payments
arrived by mail after the experiment. Thus, early payments did not have any special
credibility arising from being paid during the experiment session itself. This is a standard
procedure in discounting experiments to help make early and late payments equally cred-
ible. Second, experiments for both data sets were conducted by the professional agency
used by the SOEP, which is highly credible and well-known because of its role in con-
ducting election polls for German public television. Interviewers also left their contact
details at the end of the experiment, making it easy for subjects to contact the institute.
There were no reports, from any of the interviewers, about subjects expressing concerns
regarding credibility of payments. Third, all participants in the SOEP data were members
of the SOEP panel itself; unlike participants in most inter-temporal choice experiments,
these individuals were in a long-term relationship with the individual surveyor conducting
the experiment. Thus, perceived credibility of payments should have been very strong
regardless of timing. Fourth, we nd the same qualitative results across our two data
sets, in terms of how behavior varies with time horizon length and timing, despite using
dierent procedures for the timing of payment deliveries. This suggests that credibility
concerns linked to timing of payment delivery do not drive the results.16
15 As pointed out by Andrioni and Sprenger (2010) and others, unequal credibility of payments could
generate the appearance of declining discounting in SD comparisons, because the earlier time horizon
includes an immediate, especially credible payment while the later horizon does not. This is particularly
likely if the early payment is actually received during the experimental session. For a series of reasons
discussed in the text, however, credibility is high in our design, and thus it is unlikely that unequal
credibility could explain time horizon eects in our particular data set. Furthermore, it would not
explain patterns that resemble declining discounting in OD comparisons, constant discounting in SD
comparisons, or increasing discounting in OSD comparisons, all of which we nd. Thus, while unequal
credibility of payments could in some settings generate spurious declining discounting, this does not
seem to explain the time horizon eects we observe.
16 For the SOEP data, payments were mailed at the time that they became cashable, and thus credibility
depended on the perception that the agency would in fact deliver the payments as promised. For all
of the reasons discussed above, there should have been no credibility concerns about payments from
the agency in general, as well as no special concerns about relative credibility of late payments. The
10A nal note on the design concerns the length of the front-end-delay. Many previous
studies that test discounting assumptions have had front-end-delays ranging from one day
to as long as one month (e.g., Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Harrison et al., 2002). While
useful for equalizing credibility, a potential drawback of such a delay is reduced \immedi-
acy" of early payments. Indeed, some non-constant discounting models, which assume a
discrete drop in discount rates between the present and future, are based on the intuition
that present-bias reects psychological processes that respond to immediate rewards. To
the extent that the front-end-delay eliminates immediacy of early payments, such a design
feature may \miss" present-bias. Unfortunately, the verdict is still out on how immediate
payments would need to be, in order to trigger the aforementioned psychological processes.
Qualitatively, results actually appear quite similar across designs that do and do not have
same-day payments, e.g., patterns consistent with declining discounting have been found
in both.17 Making a trade-o between credibility and immediacy, we chose the short-
est possible front-end delay compatible with avoiding a same-day credibility problem.18
Importantly, models where present bias occurs within the window of the front-end-delay
still make clear testable predictions in the experiment, namely constant IRRs across time
horizons.
2.2 Treatments
Table 1 summarizes the various treatments. As shown in the table, the CSS data involved
500 subjects participating in the experiments, with three dierent measures of annual
procedure used for the CSS data did, however, potentially allow for a dierent type of credibility concern:
the agency mailed all payments immediately regardless of when they became cashable, so individuals
might worry that they themselves would be more likely to lose later payments before they become
cashable (although the money on the line should have provided an incentive not to lose payments).
We nd the same qualitative results using the SOEP data as in the CSS data, which suggests that a
potential fear of losing late payments does not drive the results in the latter case.
17 It is quite intuitive that the present is today, and the future is tomorrow. On the other hand, one
could think that immediacy is actually about having a consumption opportunity literally in one's hand,
and that even a delay of ten minutes might already be too long for rewards to feel immediate. Almost
without exception studies have had a delay of at least some hours before early rewards are usable, so
rewards are not truly immediate (e.g., Burks et al., 2009). One exception is McClure et al. (2007),
where rewards are squirts of juice over the course of minutes.
18 Mainly for the purposes of concreteness, so as to avoid having to say 1 or 2 days repeatedly, the
experimental instructions told subjects that immediate rewards would be referred to as being received
\Today"[quotes included]. At the same time, the instructions were very clear that all rewards would
arrive after the experiment by post, and that: \Today means you can cash the check you receive by
post immediately". Ultimately, we see little evidence that this wording lead to dierential behavior in
early versus later time horizons. For example, observed impatience is similar regardless of whether the
time horizon involves early payments \Today", or involves early payments in 12 months.
11IRR for each subject. The measures come from three dierent time horizons, 0 to 6
months (T06), 0 to 12 months (T012), and 6 months to 12 months (T612). The order of
the treatments in the CSS data was randomized across individuals. The early payment
was always 100 Euros, and the largest delayed payment always implied an annual IRR
of 50 percent (compounded semi-annually) for waiting the specied length of time. If
individuals never chose the later payment, their IRR was right-censored, and coded as
having a (lower-bound) value of 52.5 percent.
The SOEP data dier in that there are only two treatments for each individual (see
Table 1), and treatments also varied across sub-samples. For a rst sub-sample of 490
individuals, impatience was measured for 0 to 6 months (T06) and 0 to 12 months (T012),
giving two measures of annual IRR for each subject. The second sub-sample of 487 were
asked about 0 to 1 month (T01) and 0 to 12 months (T012). For the third sub-sample of
526 we measured discounting for 0 to 1 month (T01b) and 12 to 13 months (T1213). The
measures for the third sub-sample were dierent, because IRRs were measured in steps
of 5 percent rather than 2.5 percent, and the upper-bound IRR in each horizon was 105
percent rather than 52.5 percent. We denote the one-month measure in this sub-sample
T01b, to distinguish it from T01 in the second sub-sample. Order was predetermined in the
SOEP data: for the rst two sub-samples, the T012 measure was always elicited rst; for
the third sub-sample, T01b was elicited rst. A random device on the computer selected
whether an individual was assigned to the rst, second, or third sub-sample experiments.
In the SOEP data the early payment was always 200 Euros, and thus stakes were higher
than in the CSS, even accounting for the lower payment probability of 1=9 rather than
1=7.19
2.3 Behavioral Predictions
The type of experimental design we implemented has been used extensively to distinguish
between constant and non-constant discounting models, based on a certain set of main-
tained assumptions. We rst derive predictions under the usual assumptions, and then
discuss how predictions change if the assumptions are relaxed. Generally, relaxing these
19 The relatively large nominal values involved in the experiment help mitigate distortions due to subjects
rounding delayed payment amounts up to the nearest dollar. See Andersen et al. (2011) for a discussion
of this issue.
12assumptions makes models predict constant discounting in the context of the experiment,
regardless of the shape of the discount function. In this case, however, the broader class of
models still makes a testable prediction, namely invariance of discounting to time horizon.
We illustrate the predictions by considering, without loss of generality, an example
with three time horizons, T06, T012, and T612, corresponding to the structure of the CSS
data. The early payment is always 100 for each horizon, compounding occurs once every
6 months, and for simplicity a period is assumed to be 6-months long. Assume for now
that early payments at time 0 are literally available on the day of the experiment, when
preferences are measured. Also, adopt the usual maintained assumptions that utility
is locally linear, that people treat monetary payments as consumption, that utility is
additively separable over time and time stationary, and that the discount function is
multiplicatively separable.
When making decisions in T06, T012, and T612, subjects decide for the early or
late payment depending on whether or not the oered annual rate of return r in a given




















Where Z(6), Z(12), and Z(12) denote later payments for each time horizon, available at 6
months, 12 months, and 12 months from the present, respectively. We denote by Z(6)T06,
Z(12)T012, and Z(12)T612 the lowest late payment such that the individual prefers to
wait for the corresponding time horizon. These observed amounts establish the points of




















Note that from now on we omit the time argument for delayed payments, for ease of
exposition. We also neglect the fact that the delayed payment is actually a discrete
variable in the experiment, and thus that we can infer only a range for the IRR; this has
no consequences for the qualitative predictions, and eases exposition.20 Solving for IRRs
20 The lowest delayed payment that is preferred establishes an upper bound for the IRR, while the largest
delayed payment that is not preferred establishes the lower bound. One can think of the predictions as























We now consider how dierent assumptions about time preference aect predictions for
IRRs.
2.3.1 Constant discounting
In the case of constant discounting, an individual is indierent between the early and




)100 = ZT06; (1 +

2
)2100 = ZT012; (1 +

2
)100 = ZT612; (3)
where  is the constant rate of time preference. As this is the same as condition (1), it
follows directly that a constant discounter chooses ZT06, ZT012, and ZT612 such that the
measured IRR is invariant with respect to time horizon: IRRT06 = IRRT012 = IRRT612 =
.
2.3.2 Declining and increasing discounting
In the case of declining discounting, there are dierent discount rates, 1 and 2, for
periods 1 and 2 (rst 6 months and second 6 months), such that 1 > 2. In this case the
points of indierence in T06, T012, and T612 are given by
(1 + 1)100 = ZT06; (1 + 1)(1 + 2)100 = ZT012; (1 + 2)100 = ZT612: (4)
Substituting into (2) shows that, if choices are generated by this model, measured IRRs
will have the form
IRRT06 = 2((1+1) 1); IRRT012 = 2(((1+1)(1+2))
1
2 1); IRRT612 = 2((1+2) 1):
(5)
Given 1 > 2 this implies IRRT06 > IRRT012 > IRRT612. Intuitively, impatience should
be greatest in T06 with declining discounting, because it includes the present and extends
the least far into the future. Behavior in T612 should be the most patient, because it
14excludes the present and only concerns payments relatively far into the future. Behavior
in T012 should be in-between, as it includes the present but also extends substantially into
the future. An analogous argument establishes that with increasing discounting, the model
predicts the opposite ranking of IRRs by time horizon, IRRT06 < IRRT012 < IRRT612.
2.3.3 Predictions with dierent/weaker assumptions
Relaxing the assumption that early payments arrive immediately may matter for the
predictions of some types of non-constant discounting models. Specically, the fact that
early payments actually arrive up to two days in the future matters for models where
there are discrete changes in the discount rate during those two days, followed by constant
discounting thereafter. A particularly important example is the quasi-hyperbolic model
(e.g., Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), in the case
that the period is assumed to be less than two days (the model is silent about the correct
period assumption). Such a model could imply a high discount rate between today and
tomorrow, and then a constant discount rate between any two future periods.21 Given the
experimental design, this type of model thus predicts IRRT06 = IRRT012 = IRRT612, the
same as with constant discounting, i.e., invariance of IRRs with respect to time horizon
is needed for the model to explain the data. If the present bias is assumed to extend
more than 2 days into the future, but less than 6 months, then the quasi-hyperbolic model
makes the same predictions as models with hyperbolic, or other forms, of continuously
declining discounting, IRRT06 > IRRT012 > IRRT612.
Another, more recent version of the quasi-hyperbolic model involves a xed, rather
than variable, cost of receiving payments in the future (Benhabib et al., 2010). The xed-
cost specication allows this model to predict a \magnitude eect", a tendency for mea-
sured impatience to decrease as stake sizes increase, ceteris paribus. Aside from predicting
a magnitude eect, however, this model has the same properties as the quasi-hyperbolic
model: There is an extra cost of waiting, above and beyond exponential discounting, when
comparing the present to the next future period; when comparing two adjacent, future
periods, however, the extra cost applies to both periods, and thus cancels out, leaving
discounting to be governed solely by the exponential discount rate. The quasi-hyperbolic
21 The model is quasi-hyperbolic in the sense that it provides a step-function approximation to a hyperbolic
discount function (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997).
15model with xed costs thus predicts IRRT06 > IRRT012 > IRRT612 if the present ex-
tends further than two days into the future, or invariance of the IRR to time horizon,
IRRT06 = IRRT012 = IRRT612, if it does not, the same as the standard quasi-hyperbolic
model.22
Relaxing the (usually implicit) assumption made by many previous studies, that
people treat money rewards as consumption, changes the qualitative predictions for all
non-constant discounting models. If payments are viewed as fully fungible, as predicted by
standard theory, then subjects should use the experiment as an opportunity for arbitrage,
and in all time horizons choose to wait when the annual rate of return exceeds the relevant
market interest rate (this argument is made, e.g., by Coller and Williams, 1999, or Harrison
et al., 2002). Outside of the experiment subjects can then use the credit market as
appropriate, for example, borrowing against future experimental earnings using the lower
market interest rate in order to nance their desire for present-biased consumption. All
discounting models in this case predict IRRT06 = IRRT012 = IRRT612, at the relevant
interest rate faced by each individual. Thus, the ability of discounting models to explain
the data assuming full arbitrage depends on whether IRRs are invariant to time horizon.
It has also been typical to assume that the unobserved utility function is linear, for
the range of stakes used in discounting experiments, i.e., that earning 20 or 30 more Euros
should not have an impact on the marginal utility of money. From some viewpoints, this
assumption is plausible (see, e.g., Rabin, 2000), while another strand of the literature has
22 In this model, a payment Zt received in the future is discounted by t = 
t  
b
Zt, where  =
1
1+ and
b > 0 is a xed cost of having a payment arrive in the future, which goes to zero as the stakes in the
experiment increase. A payment received at t = 0 is not discounted, i.e., 0 = 1. The present value
of a future payment is thus given by tZt = 
tZt   b. Importantly, between-period discounting in
the future is the same as in the exponential model (and as in the quasi-hyperbolic model with variable
costs). I.e., the Euler equation for consumption in future periods t + 1 and t + 2 is 
t+1Zt+1   b =

t+2Zt+2   b ! Zt+1 = Zt+2. Maintaining the assumption that the present extends more than two












































These equations imply IRR
T06 > IRR
T012 > IRR
T612. If, instead, the present-bias falls within the
window of two days from the present, all terms involving b are eliminated, the conditions reduce to




T612. Qualitative predictions are similar using the alternative specication of the model, discussed
by Benhabib et al. (2010), where exponential discounting is applied to b as well as the future payment.
16pointed to evidence of small-stakes risk aversion in lottery experiments, and interpreted
this behavior as indicating that the marginal utility of income is diminishing even over
small stakes (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008).23 If utility is concave, then some of the apparent
impact of time horizon length on IRRs could be due to non-linear utility. For example,
imposing linearity could overestimate the true dierence in IRRs between short and long
time horizons, given the right type of concavity of the unobserved utility function.24 As
we discuss in detail later, however, even if utility is concave this is unlikely to be more
than a partial explanation for the results, for quantitative reasons. Discrepancies in IRRs
across time horizons are suciently large that it would require a highly implausible degree
of concavity, far beyond typical utility calibrations based on lottery experiments or other
data sources, to explain more than part of the dierence.
If the assumptions about time separability and time stationarity of the utility func-
tion are not valid, then measured IRRs may vary freely across time horizons for reasons
unrelated to non-constant discounting and dynamic inconsistency. For example, people
may anticipate that the marginal utility of consumption in the future depends not just on
distance from the present, due to discounting, but also on state-contingent preferences,
for example an upcoming vacation. In this case, \anything goes" and the model is very
exible, so one could observe many dierent patterns of IRRs across time horizons, for any
given discount function. Our approach is to assess whether the data can be explained by
models that maintain the workhorse assumptions of separability and stationarity, which
are used for most applications of discounted utility theory.
23 There are alternative explanations for small-stakes risk aversion besides diminishing marginal utility,
such as \loss aversion" (see, e.g., Rabin and Thaler, 2001).
24 Allowing for concavity means that we overestimate the level of IRR for any given time horizon. If the






















T012, and ] IRR
T612
< IRR
T612. For our purposes, however,
the more relevant question is how the relative sizes of IRRs for dierent time horizons change, allowing
for concavity. There are two eects that may work in opposite directions. On the one hand, introducing
concavity leads to a bigger reduction in the value of the ratio Z





T06)=u(100) . This works in the direction of reducing
IRR
T012 by more than the IRRs for short horizons, implying that we underestimate the true discrepancy
between IRRs for short and long horizons by assuming linearity. On the other hand, a given change
in the ratio in late payment to early payment causes a larger decrease in IRRs for short horizons than
long horizons, due to compounding (this is immediately observable from the relevant derivatives of IRRs
with respect to these ratios). Thus, whether or not concavity understates or exaggerates the dierence
in IRRs depends on the relative sizes of these dierent eects.
173 Results on IRR and time horizon
Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution functions of the annual IRR for each of the
dierent time horizons. The top panel shows results from the CSS data, and the bottom
panel shows results from the SOEP data. For the SOEP data, we pool the T012 measures
across the two sub-samples that have this treatment, as the order and stake sizes are
identical.25
In the top panel of Figure 1, we see that people in the CSS data exhibit a dierent
distribution of IRRs for T012 than for T06, or T612 (p < 0:001; p < 0:001; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov), in the direction of lower IRRs and greater patience for the 12-month horizon.
People are quite similar in impatience, however, comparing the distributions of IRRs for
the T06 and T612 measures, and there is no signicant dierence (p < 0:90; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov). Thus, people tend to be more patient for long horizons than short horizons, but
similarly impatient over the short horizons regardless of the starting date. The bottom
panel shows the same qualitative patterns in the SOEP data. Observed IRRs increase
monotonically as time horizon length decreases, with greater impatience for T06 than
T012 (p < 0:001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov), and even greater impatience for T01 than T06
(p < 0:001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov). At the same time, IRRs are relatively insensitive to
the starting date of the time horizon, in that people are similarly impatient for T01b and
T1213 (p < 0:98; Kolmogorov-Smirnov). The magnitudes of the dierences in IRRs are
also substantial. For example, in the CSS data, median IRRs for T06 and T612 are 10
percentage points higher than the median IRR for T012, and in the SOEP data, the IRR
for T01 is more than 25 percentage points higher than the median IRR for T012.
The distribution for T01 is also similar to T01b and T1213, except for a deviation
in the direction of greater patience starting around the middle of the range for T01,
potentially due to either an order eect, or an eect of the dierent upper bound for the
IRR, or both.26 Despite this framing dierence between the one-month measures, they
are all clearly more similar to each other, than to measures with longer horizons.
25 Empirically, the cumulatives for the two measures considered separately are very similar, and are not
signicantly dierent, using either parametric (p < 0:849; Kolmogorov-Smirnov) or non-parametric tests
(p < 0:539; Mann-Whitney). Medians are also identical for the two sub-samples.
26 The distributions for T01b and T1213 are each signicantly dierent from the distribution for T01
(p < 0:001; p < 0:001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov).
18Tables 2 and Table 3 provide another way to look at the results on IRR and time
horizon, using interval regressions that correct for right- and left-censoring of the depen-
dent variable. The dependent variable is the measured IRR, and independent variables are
dummy variables for time horizon length. Standard errors are robust and adjusted to allow
for potential correlation of the error term across observations from the same individual.
In Column (1) of Table 2 we see that IRRs in the CSS data are signicantly lower for
the T012 measure compared to T06, by more than 6 percentage points, while there is not
a signicant dierence between T612 and T06. Table 3 presents similar regression analysis
based on the SOEP data. Results are reported separately for the three sub-samples, in
Panel A, B, and C, respectively. Looking at Column (1) we again see a pattern of lower
IRRs for longer horizons, but similar IRRs across horizons of the same length regardless of
the starting date: T012 is signicantly lower than T06 by about 5 percentage points, and
lower than T01 by about 20 percentage points, while T1213 is not signicantly dierent
from T01b and the point estimate indicates only a 1 percentage point dierence.27
The regression analysis also allows checking robustness with respect to order eects,
in the CSS data where order was randomized. We add dummy variables for the dierent
possible treatment orders, and interactions of T012 and T612 with all of the dierent
orders, to the specication used in Column (1) of Table 2. We again nd a signicant
dierence between T012 and T06, but not between T06 and T612. Furthermore, all inter-
action terms are not statistically signicant, individually or jointly.28 Thus, the qualitative
results are systematic across all dierent possible treatment orders, and are not driven by
any particular treatment ordering.29
In subsequent columns, Table 2 and Table 3 explore the robustness of the qualitative
27 It is noteworthy that IRRs tend to be lower in the SOEP data than the CSS data, for comparable time
horizons (e.g., compare the constant term in Column (1) of Table 2 to the constant term in Column
(1), Panel A, of Table 3). One interpretation is a \magnitude eect", such that the level of impatience
decreases with stake size for a given pair of horizons. Such an eect would be an anomaly for standard
discounting models, where the IRR is assumed to be independent of stake size. Indeed, many studies
report nding lower IRRs as stake sizes increase (see Frederick et al., 2002). An alternative explanation
for this stylized fact, however, could be that the unobserved utility function is more linear for higher
stakes (see Andersen et al., 2011, for a discussion).
28 Results available upon request.
29 We do observe that the impact of time horizon length is quantitatively smaller in rst treatments,
than in second or third treatments, i.e., the eect appears to be larger the more treatments individuals
experience. The tendency for impatience to be greater in short than long horizons is still present
even in rst treatments, however, and the dierence-in-dierences for time horizon eects, comparing
rst treatment to second treatment, or rst treatment to third treatment, or rst treatment to later
treatments, are not statistically signicant.
19results observed for the whole sample, across dierent sub-populations. We consider sub-
populations dened by gender, age, cognitive ability, education level, income level, and
credit constraints. Such variables might matter for how individuals respond to dierent
measures of IRR, for a variety of reasons. For example, cognitive ability or education might
be related to the level of nancial sophistication of an individual, and familiarity with
market interest rates, and potentially aect sensitivity to varying time horizon.30 Income
or credit constraints could potentially matter if people cannot borrow and have expenses
that will arrive within the scope of the time horizons considered in the experiment.31
Looking at the regressions estimates, it is apparent that the qualitative results on time
horizon eects are quite robust, and do not appear to be driven by the degree of cognitive
ability, nancial sophistication, or nancial situation: The dierence between long and
short time horizons is observed for every sub-sample, in both data sets, regardless of
the measures used, while horizons of similar length, but dierent starting dates, are not
signicantly dierent.32 Thus, our data indicate that the patterns we nd are not isolated
to specic populations, but rather are a quite robust and general tendency.
Similar conclusions arise from an individual-level analysis, showing that the aggre-
gate results are not driven by any sort of misleading composition eect due to heteroge-
neous individual types. To identify individual \types", we focus on the CSS data, because
there we have all three types of comparisons (OD, SD, and OSD) for each person and an
ability to check whether the aggregate pattern is also present at the individual level. Table
4 reports fractions of individuals exhibiting dierent possible qualitative choice patterns
across the dierent measures. Adhering to the usual maintained assumptions for testing
discounting models, we classify individuals who consistently have the same IRR across all
time horizons as constant discounters (this fraction could also include quasi-hyperbolic
discounters, or subjects engaging in arbitrage, depending on assumptions). People with
30 Cognitive ability is measured using two dierent tests, which are then standardized and averaged to
provide a measure of overall cognitive ability. For a description of the tests see Dohmen et al. (2010).
31 To create the dummy variable indicating being credit constrained, we use a question that asks: \If you
suddenly encountered an unforeseen situation, and had to pay an expense of 1,000 Euros within the
next two weeks, would it be possible for you to make that payment?"
32 In previous work (Dohmen et al., 2010) we found a signicant correlation between cognitive ability and
impatience measured over an annual time horizon (T012). We replicate this nding in the CSS data,
even when averaging across all three time horizons, and also in the SOEP for each sub-sample, averaging
across time horizons. Thus, there is accumulating evidence that the level of IRR for an individual is
related to cognitive ability. By contrast, the overall pattern of dierences in IRR across time horizons
that we observe are equally pronounced for low and high ability individuals.
20IRRT06 > IRRT012 > IRRT612 are classied as declining discounters, and people with
the opposite pattern are classied as increasing. We exclude individuals who cannot be
classied unambiguously, due to right-censoring of the IRRs.
One feature of the individual-level data that is immediately apparent, looking at
the rst row of Table 4, is that the modal pattern of individual choice matches the ag-
gregate results; almost 50 percent of individuals are more impatient for both short time
horizons than the longer time horizon, contrary to standard discounting models. Thus,
the aggregate results are indicative of the most prevalent pattern of individual choices.
The \Other" category is also inconsistent with discounting assumptions. It includes in-
dividuals who have lower IRRs in both short horizons than the long horizon, and those
having at least one short horizon that is dierent from the long horizon, but the same IRR
for the long horizon and the other short horizon. Overall, about 65 percent of individuals
are inconsistent with all discounting types.
The rst row of Table 4 also shows the frequencies of individuals who can be clas-
sied as being fully consistent with the predictions of constant, declining, or increasing
discounters, which are 11.34, 11.63, and 10.76 percent, respectively. Thus, while there are
some individuals who cannot be ruled out as being consistent with the usual candidate
discounting models, these are relatively infrequent.33
Since the main message of the individual-level results is that most individuals make
choices inconsistent with usual candidate discounting models, it is interesting to assess
whether this is robust, in particular to potential \trembling hand" errors. One way to
interpret time horizon sensitivity could be in terms of such (random) errors. To allow
for relatively large trembling hand errors, we assess how the classications change if we
adopt an even weaker condition for equality of IRRs across time horizons. We convert
the switching point for each time horizon into an interval 7.5 percentage points wide, by
taking the upper and lower bounds and subtracting and adding 2.5 percentage points,
respectively. We then classify IRRs as being dierent only if their respective intervals do
33 Notably, there is a way in which the results shown in the rst row of Table 4 may slightly overstate the
frequency of individuals who are constant discounters. We have treated the IRRs for two time horizons
as being equal if they have the same lower bound, but the true IRRs for each horizon could potentially be
unequal, lying anywhere in the 2.5 percentage point interval starting from the lower bound. Thus, some
of those classied as constant discounters could in fact be types who are inconsistent with discounting
models, and some could be types who are consistent with declining or increasing discounting. This
would mean that 65 percent being inconsistent with usual candidate discounting assumptions is a lower
bound.
21not overlap at all. This procedure is very conservative, in that true IRRs can dier by
as much as 15 percentage points, and still be classied as equal. Clearly this procedure
will tend to increase the frequency of individuals classied as constant discounters, for
mechanical reasons, and systematically works against nding declining, increasing, or
intransitive types. This is useful, however, as a hard test of the robustness of the main
result of the individual level analysis: that a substantial fraction of individuals are not
consistent with any of the discounting assumptions.
The second row of Table 4 shows the results. Not surprisingly, the fraction of
constant discounters increases substantially, to 39.32 percent, and the fractions of declining
and increasing discounters are smaller, 8.36 and 6.81 percent, respectively. The fraction
of individuals who are inconsistent with standard discounting models remains substantial,
however, and is still the relative majority among types, at approximately 46 percent of the
sample. Thus, the conclusion that many individuals exhibit behavior that falls outside the
bounds of the discounting framework is robust to allowing for even rather large random
errors in decision making.
3.1 Discussion: Models and the stylized facts
To summarize, the empirical analysis yields two main stylized facts: (1) People are more
impatient for short than long time horizons; (2) people are relatively insensitive to when
a given time horizon starts. In the CSS data this is shown by the pattern IRRT06 =
IRRT612 > IRRT012, and in the SOEP data by IRRT01b = IRRT1213  IRRT01 >
IRRT06 > IRRT012.
In light of the predictions derived in Section 2.3, it is clear that this pattern is not well
explained by either constant, declining, or increasing discounting, maintaining the usual
identifying assumptions. The sensitivity of IRRs to time horizon length is inconsistent with
constant discounting, while the insensitivity of IRRs to starting date of a given horizon is
contrary to the key prediction of declining or increasing discounting (and also to recent
two-system models that predict declining discounting; see, e.g., Fundenberg and Levine,
2012).
Importantly, this inconsistency is revealed by having a design with multiple types
of time horizons comparisons. Focusing only on one type of comparison, the data would
22have seemed to strongly support one discounting assumption or another. In particular,
the tendency to have higher IRRs in short time horizons than long horizons means that
the data would seem to strongly conform to the declining discounting prediction, looking
solely at OD comparisons. On the other hand, the relative insensitivity to starting date
means that behavior is much closer to the prediction of constant discounting, looking
only at SD comparisons. And nally, because of greater IRRs in short than long time
horizons, independent of starting date, OSD type comparisons would seem to indicate a
strong increasing discounting pattern. Thus, focusing on any one time horizon comparison
could be misleading, by seeming to support a particular discounting assumption when in
fact the data as a whole are not consistent with any of the usual candidate discounting
assumptions.
Relaxing the assumptions that people treat money as consumption, the usual candi-
date models are still not consistent with the data. If people treat money as fully fungible,
and therefore use the experiment as an opportunity for arbitrage, IRRs should be in-
variant to time horizon, contrary to the ndings. The pattern is also inconsistent with
non-constant discounting models where the discount rate is assumed to drop discretely at
some point in the near future.34 If the drop in the discount rate occurs two or more days
into the future, then in our experimental design these models make the same predictions
as those with continuously declining discounting, and the insensitivity of IRRs to start
date is a puzzle. If the drop occurs before two days, then the model predicts constant
IRRs across time horizons, because even the earliest payments are available starting two
days in the future. In this case the nding that time horizon does strongly inuence IRRs
is a puzzle.
Allowing for concave utility over the stakes in the experiment also seems unlikely to
explain the results. This is because the dierences in IRRs across time horizons are too
large to plausibly reect concavity. For example, assuming a standard CRRA utility func-
tion, increasing the degree of concavity tends to reduce the size of IRRT06 and IRRT612
relative to IRRT012, but one would need a coecient of relative risk aversion, , equal to
35 to equalize the true IRRs for short and long horizons. This is the same magnitude as
34 In addition to the quasi-hyperbolic model, and the xed-cost version of that model by Benhabib et
al. (2010), this class includes `two-system" models that make similar predictions (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006), and the xed cost version of non-constant discounting discussed by
Benhabib et al. (2010).
23the coecient value that would be needed to explain the equity premium puzzle, and is
typically regarded as implausibly high (see Siegel and Thaler, 1997). Furthermore, recent
empirical estimates of , from lottery experiments with similar stake sizes to our inter-
temporal choice experiments, are far smaller. The median parameter value is estimated
to be in the range of 0.55 to 0.75 (Andersen et al., 2008; Andersen et al., 2010).35 Using
these parameter values, or even substantially larger values, the relative size of IRRs is
largely unchanged. For example, moving from linear utility to utility with  = 0:75, the
ratio of IRRT012 to IRRT06 for the median individual goes from 0.73 to 0.74, and the
ratio of IRRT012 to IRRT612 goes from 0.69 to 0.70.36 Other recent estimates, based on
large-stakes (hypothetical) lottery questions administered in a large representative survey,
show parameters in a similar range, and show that  = 35 is completely outside the sup-
port of the empirical distribution (see Dohmen et al., 2005). Thus, while the right type of
unobserved concavity could in principal play a role in explaining time horizon eects, it
seems unlikely that is explains more than a small portion of the eects that we observe.
We summarize the ability of dierent models to explain individual time horizon
comparisons, as well as the data as a whole, in Table 5 (in the Appendix). The most
important message of the table is that none of the models can accommodate the whole
set of facts. The table is also potentially useful in that it suggests which types of designs
may tend to nd which types of patterns.
We also see in the CSS data, where there are three time horizon comparisons per
individual, that the data are inconsistent with a broader class of models, because they
imply a violation of transitivity. This is true focusing on the aggregate choice patterns, and
also for the majority of subjects at the individual level, maintaining the usual assumptions
of time stationarity and separability. Intuitively, the violation arises because the 12-month
measure, and the two 6-month measures, give conicting information about an individual's
preferences, for instance in terms of the size of late payment needed to induce waiting 12
35 In this approach, lottery experiments generate modest variations in earnings, and risk aversion is as-
sumed to reect diminishing marginal utility of money over this range.































using  = 0:75 and median late payments of 119, 129, and 120 Euros for T06, T012, and T612, respec-
tively.
24months. This is dierent from dynamic inconsistency, because the inconsistency is present
at a given point in time.
More formally, note that T06, T012, and T612 pose individuals with choices between
dierent bundles, where elements are payments received at 0, 6, or 12 months. In the data,
we observe for each time horizon the late payment amounts ZT06, ZT012, and ZT612 such
that an individual is indierent between the bundle involving the early payment and the
bundle involving the late payment. The table below shows these particular bundles for
each horizon:
T06 T012 T612
A (100;0;0) A (100;0;0) D (0;100;0)
B (0;ZT06;0) C (0;0;ZT012) E (0;0;ZT612)
where individuals have preferences A  B, A  C, and D  E when presented with each
choice pair in isolation. For now, we are assuming that utility is linear, and u(x) = x.
An inconsistency arises, however, when one compares across choice pairs. From
T012, we observe the ZT012 that makes an individual indierent between receiving 100 at








(1 + 1)(1 + 2)
: (7)
Combining the observed IRRs for T06 and T612, we can also construct a late payment
ZT0120
that should make the individual indierent between 100 at time 0 or waiting 12









(1 + ~ 1)(1 + ~ 2)
: (8)
For the typical individual, however, the dierences in IRRs that we observe for short and











1 + ~ 1

1
1 + ~ 2

: (9)
I.e., total discounting over 12 months is dierent, based on the 6-month measures, than
it is based on the 12-month measure. This immediately implies (from (7) and (8)) that
ZT012 6= ZT0120
.
25To see how this inconsistency translates into a violation of transitivity, note that the





and since ZT012 6= ZT0120
, should not be indierent for ZT012. I.e., A  C0 =) A 6 C.
But combining these implied preferences, with the preferences that are actually revealed
in T012 for late payment ZT012, we have A  C 6 C0  A. This implies A  C 6 A, a
violation of transitivity.
There is also a violation of transitivity relaxing the assumption of linear utility, and
allowing for a concave (monotonic) utility function u(), as long as (9) holds. As discussed
above, (9) holds even if utility is concave, unless the utility function is characterized








(1 + ~ 1)(1 + ~ 2)
: (10)
.
Given (1 + 1)(1 + 2) 6= (1 + ~ 1)(1 + ~ 2) we clearly have ZT012 6= ZT0120
, and there is an
inconsistency in preferences that again implies a violation of transitivity.
If one relaxes the assumptions of time stationarity of utility, and separability, the
data need not imply a violation of transitivity. If the utility function can vary arbitrarily
over time, or the discount factor enters the period utility function, then \anything goes".
However, these are usual workhorse assumptions of the discounted utility framework, and
so a violation conditional on these assumptions is still relevant for the types of models
used in a wide variety of applications. Referring again to Table 4, all individuals except
those who fall into the strictly constant, declining, or increasing categories have choice
patterns that imply violations of transitivity, maintaining the assumptions of separability
at time stationarity. This is true for any arbitrary discounting function.
264 Discussion
The results in this paper pose an important puzzle for understanding inter-temporal choice.
People are more impatient for short than long time horizons, contrary to constant discount-
ing, but insensitive to starting date, in contrast to non-constant discounting models where
the starting date is crucial. This pattern of inter-temporal choice is also inconsistent with
a broader class of models, in that it implies a violation of transitivity. The phenomenon is
robust to real incentives, it is pervasive in the population as a whole as well as in dierent
sub-groups, and it replicates across dierent data sets and dierent types of measures.
These results have implications for interpreting previous empirical literatures, and suggest
new directions for modeling inter-temporal choice.
4.1 Experimental Measures and Life Outcomes
One implication of our results concerns how to interpret the previous empirical literature
on time horizon eects and self-control problems. Previous studies (see footnote 2) have
had only limited success in predicting life outcomes thought to reect self-control problems
(smoking, high body mass index, overspending, etc.), using experimental measures of time
horizon eects. One possible explanation, suggested by our ndings, is that some other
underlying mechanism besides non-constant discounting causes \time horizon sensitivity".
Indeed, time horizon eects turn out to be primarily inconsistent with non-constant dis-
counting models. This would help explain why time horizon eects are not that strongly
related to life outcomes chosen specically because of their self-control problem character.
Our results also suggest another explanation, however, that would apply even if some time
horizon eects do reect declining or increasing discounters. To date, empirical analyses
have typically been based on a single time horizon comparison, and thus those who are
candidates for being, say, a true constant discounter, are potentially lumped together with
many types who are actually intransitive but are misclassied. In this case, attenuation
bias could contribute to the weak results.
To shed some light on whether indicators of declining or increasing discounting are
strong predictors of self-control problems in life, once one corrects for mis-classication
and reduces attenuation bias, we present a nal set of results from our CSS data. In
the CSS data we have three measures for each individual, which makes it possible to
27separately identify constant, declining, increasing, and intransitive choice patterns. Table
6 (in the Appendix) reports regression results, where we look at a range of life outcomes:
smoking, poor nutrition, drinking, body mass index, days per year with an overdrawn
checking account, log net income, self-reported tendency to save, and an overall index
of these outcomes. These types of outcomes have been examined in previous studies,
because of their presumed links to self-control problems, although typically a given study
has considered only a few rather than the whole set. As a control variable, we include the
average IRR for an individual across all three time horizons, to account for the possibility
that dierent time horizon patterns might be correlated with the overall level of IRR. We
also include a set of controls for personal characteristics, including gender, age, cognitive
ability, and education, which are similar to those used by Chabris et al. (2008).37 To
our knowledge, ours is the rst empirical analysis on how measures of time horizon eects
relate to life outcomes, using a specication that identies intransitive types.
Table 6 shows that indicators for declining or increasing discounting are only mod-
estly successful at predicting self-control problems in life, even in a specication that helps
address attenuation bias.38 In unreported regressions, we also used a specication without
an indicator for intransitive types, so that these were included in the omitted category
with constant discounters. In that case we found that indicators for increasing discounting
and declining discounting patterns were even less strongly related to outcomes; the only
signicant result was for declining and the overall index. Thus, including the intransi-
tivity indicator does sharpen predictions, consistent with reducing attenuation bias, but
the resulting predictive success is still modest. It is also relevant that, in Table 6, the
relationships of increasing and declining choice patterns in the experiment to outcomes
in life are qualitatively the same. This is in contrast to what one might expect if these
capture dierent shapes of discount functions; declining and increasing discounters should
have opposite forms of self-control problems, such that increasing discounters are, e.g.,
relatively less likely to smoke, or overspend, than constant or declining discounters. Thus,
37 Results are less precisely estimated, but qualitatively similar, without controls for personal character-
istics. Intransitivity, declining, and increasing are all signicantly related to one or two outcomes, and
the average IRR is signicantly related to more outcomes.
38 Results are based on excluding individuals who have censored IRRs for any of the time horizons. We
have similar results if we also include individuals who have just one censored IRR; these are unambigu-
ously classied in terms of constant, declining, increasing, or intransitive, type, but the there is some
imprecision in that the average level of the IRR is calculated using one right-censored value.
28in terms of predictive success, and qualitative results, these ndings are more consistent
with the rst explanation: that time horizon eects in experiments may reect some other
mechanism besides non-constant discounting and self-control problems.
We did also analyze the relationship between time horizon eects and life outcomes
using the SOEP data. There we have the same types of life outcomes as in the CSS, and
typically about 1,000 individuals for our estimation sample (those with non-censored ob-
servations, and non-missing information for control variables and a given outcome). In this
case, however, it is not possible to identify intransitive types, because of having only one
type of time horizon comparison per individual. We nd that indicators for declining and
increasing discounting, constructed appropriately for each sub-sample, are related to very
few life outcomes. The only signicant correlation is between declining discounting and
the self-reported indicator for being a saver. With the caveat that attenuation bias is more
of a problem in this case, we again nd a weak correlation between time horizon eects
and self-control-problem outcomes. This is as one would expect, if time horizon sensitivity
in experiments largely reects some other mechanism besides self-control problems.
Notably, the best all-around predictor of life outcomes in Table 6 is the average
level of IRR, and the correlations are all in the directions one would expect, based on a
tendency to weight future consumption less heavily than the present.39 In the SOEP, we
also nd that the level of IRR is a good predictor of various life outcomes (see Vischer
et al., 2011). Thus, the life outcomes we consider do appear to have an important inter-
temporal choice component, and the experimental approach does provide a useful way to
predict such behaviors, even if time horizon eects in the experiments are only weakly
related to this set of outcomes.
4.2 Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research
In terms of directions for future research, our results highlight the potential value of
developing new types of experimental designs for measuring self-control problems.40 One
39 Results for IRR are similar and robust to dropping the indicator for intransitivity, changing denitions
of censored individuals, and excluding controls for demographics. The results are quite consistent with
those of, e.g., Chabris et al. (2008), who also use the level of discounting (instantaneous discount rate
at time zero) and nd similar relationships to a similar set of outcomes, or to Harrison et al. (2002).
40 Noor (2011) proposes an interesting, alternative approach to measuring time discounting with monetary
payments. Our results are complementary, by suggesting the potential value of incorporating multiple
types of time horizon comparison.
29possibility is to study whether behavior is more compatible with non-constant discounting
models if one uses actual consumption opportunities, rather than monetary payments.
Some studies have found patterns consistent with declining discounting in an SD design
using food rewards over the course of minutes (McClure et al., 2007) or weeks (Read and
van Leeuwen, 1998; Read et al., 1999). It has not yet been shown, however, whether a
consumption-based experiment with a comprehensive design in terms of multiple types of
time horizon comparisons, yields the same patterns of intransitivity as we nd. If the goal
is to capture self-control problems, other approaches might be also useful, for example
building on on research showing that willingness to pay increases with degree of salience,
in terms of whether or not a good is physically present (see, e.g., Bushong et al., 2010).
Individual dierences in sensitivity to such cues of immediate availability might prove to
be a good predictor of self-control problems in life.
In terms of future work on modeling inter-temporal choice, our results suggest some
potentially useful directions. One approach could be to maintain the usual structure of
discounting models, except for the assumption that discounting is indexed to calendar date.
The model could assume that people discount late payments relative to early payments,
and do so in a way that makes the IRR lower for longer durations between early and late
payments (e.g., with discount rates that decline with distance from early to late payment).
Crucially, however, the model would assume discounting is independent of the calendar
dates of early and late payments.41 Consistent with our results, such a model would imply
that people need to be compensated for waiting, but in a similar way regardless of when
the waiting should occur.
An alternative type of approach, which involves a more radical departure from dis-
counting models, has been proposed in various forms by Leland (2002), Rubinstein (2003),
and Scholten and Read (2010). These models assume that individuals make inter-temporal
choices through some kind of algorithm based on similarity judgements. For example, in
Rubinstein (2003), individuals use two similarity relations, one for time duration and one
for monetary amounts, and go through a three step process: (1) look for strict dominance,
in the sense that one option dominates along both time and money dimensions, and choose
41 See Scholten and Read (2006) and Ebert and Prelec (2007) for related discussions, on duration-dependent
discounting and time-sensitivity in discounting, respectively. Another, interesting approach to modeling
inter-temporal choice, in terms of attentional focus, has been proposed by Koszegi and Szeidl (2011).
While the model generates many novel predictions about inter-temporal decision making, it does not
explain the main pattern of behavior observed in our experiments.
30this strictly dominant option if it exists; (2) if strict dominance fails, but options are judged
similar on one dimension, then decide based on the dissimilar dimension; (3) if options
are similar along all dimensions, decide \in some other way", potentially at random. In
the context of our experiments, if people were to view dierences in monetary amounts
across long and short time horizons as signicant, but dierences in time horizon length,
or starting date, as less important, this would generate greater patience for long horizons,
where late payments are larger. It would also generate similar impatience across horizons
that dier only in terms of timing but not monetary amounts. More work is needed, how-
ever, to assess whether people indeed follow such a procedure in making inter-temporal
choices, and on understanding how similarity judgments are made.
A third approach would be to maintain canonical assumptions about time discount-
ing, but allow for biased perceptions of interest rates. In particular, there is evidence that
people are prone to a particular bias, \exponential growth bias", that involves ignoring the
role of compounding (e.g., Eisenstein and Hoch, 2005). In the context of inter-temporal
choice experiments, this type of bias could mean that individuals associate a given late
payment with a rate of return that is higher than the true rate of return, because they
fail to account for compounding. For example, in T012, neglecting the semi-annual com-
pounding would cause an individual to overestimate the rate of return implied by a given
late payment. The same individual would be un-biased, however, in their perception of
the interest rates for the semi-annual time horizons T06, and T612. In combination with
constant time discounting, this bias would generate a pattern of greater impatience in
short than long time horizons, but constant discounting for horizons of the same length,
irrespective of start date. However, while this particular bias may play a role, it is unlikely
to be the main driver of our results, because the time horizons we consider are too short
for compounding to make a large dierence. For example, for the median late payment
for T012 in the CSS data, ignoring compounding leads to overestimating the annual rate
of return by 2 percentage points, whereas the median dierence in IRRs for 12-month
versus 6-month horizons 10 percentage points.42 Nevertheless, investigating the role of
biased perceptions more generally in generating time horizon eects is a potentially fruit-
42 Some other pieces of evidence that argue against this bias explanation are the fact that the same
patterns are observed for low and high cognitive ability individuals, and more and less educated individ-
uals. Previous studies, by contrast, have found a strong positive correlation between lower educational
attainment and biased perceptions of interest rates (Stango and Zinman, 2009).
31ful direction for future research (see also Zauberman et al., 2009, and Ebert and Prelec,
2007).
Finally, the method variance we identify is potentially relevant for policy. There
is an on-going discussion about interventions designed to address self-control problems
in the form of over-spending or over-consumption of harmful goods (e.g., Camerer et al.,
2003). Such policies are often motivated with reference to declining discounting. While
there are many good reasons to think that self-control problems exist,43 the impact of
such policies may depend crucially on the types of self-control problems present in the
population, and on the extent of heterogeneity. The current state-of-the-art for identifying
the distribution of dierent types of self-control problems in the population, however, is
to use monetary choice experiments. Our results show that the particular comparison
used can matter strongly and systematically for the proportions of dierent types. For
example, OD comparisons in our CSS data imply roughly 70 percent declining discounters,
while OSD comparisons imply 70 percent increasing discounters (for the same subjects).
Furthermore, the number of individuals who are consistent with any type of discounting
model at all may in fact be quite small. More fundamentally, it may not make sense to
equate time horizon eects with self-control problems if these reect a dierent underlying
mechanism. Therefore, our results show that developing alternative measures of self-
control problems may also be important from a policy perspective.
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40A Appendix (not for publication)
A.1 Additional Tables
Table 5: Stylized Facts on IRR and Time Horizon, and Dierent Models
Constant Declining Increasing     or similar, Discounting
















T01b=T1213 Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Findings compare mean (median) IRRs for dierent time horizons. Table entries of \Yes"
indicate stylized facts that a given model can explain. Declining discounting includes, but is not
limited to, hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting with the present > 2 days, and xed
cost discounting assuming present > 2 days.     or similar, with present  2 days, includes quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, xed cost quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and two-system models that also have
a discrete drop in the discount rate. Discounting with arbitrage refers to predictions, for any shape of
discount function, when individuals do not treat monetary payments as consumption.
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Increasing Declining Intransitive Avg. IRR Obs.
BMI 1.02 1.39 0.21 -0.42 243
[0.90] [1.23] [0.65] [0.36]
Smoker 0.24** 0.25** 0.17** 0.11*** 249
[0.12] [0.11] [0.06] [0.04]
Drinking 0 0 0.06 0.05 249
[0.21] [0.21] [0.14] [0.08]
Poor nutrition -0.13 0.21 0.16 0.10* 248
[0.20] [0.16] [0.10] [0.06]
Happiness -0.34 -0.59 -0.11 -0.33** 249
[0.53] [0.45] [0.20] [0.13]
Days overdrawn 0.1 0.17 0.04 0.09** 241
[0.13] [0.11] [0.06] [0.04]
Ln(net income) -0.03 -0.12 -0.16** -0.15*** 240
[0.18] [0.12] [0.08] [0.06]
Buer saver -0.23 -0.36 0.19 -0.12 248
[0.48] [0.41] [0.24] [0.17]
Index: Bad 0.28 0.69*** 0.32** 0.25*** 226
[0.27] [0.22] [0.14] [0.08]
Notes: OLS estimates. Each row reports coecients from a regression with a dif-
ferent life outcome as the dependent variable. Key independent variables include
indicators for choice patterns consistent with declining, increasing, and intransitive
behavior in the experiment, as well as the average IRR across time horizons for an
individual. Controls include gender, age, age squared, cognitive ability (standard-
ized average of performance on two short-form tests of cognitive ability, see Dohmen
et al., 2010, for more information), and an indicator for being highly educated (in-
dicator for having taken the Abitur, a college entrance exam in Germany). BMI
denotes body mass index; Smoker is an indicator for smoking more than occasion-
ally; Drinking is an index for frequency of drinking (combining information about
wine, spirits, beer, and mixed drinks), with higher values indicating more frequent
drinking; Poor Nutrition is self-reported degree of poor nutrition, on a 4-point scale,
with higher values indicating worse nutrition; Happiness measures subjective well-
being on a 10-point scale with higher values indicating greater life satisfaction; Days
overdrawn is days per year that current deposit account is overdrawn; Buer Saver
is an indicator for self-reported tendency to keep a savings reserve in case of unex-
pected expenses; Index: Bad is an index combining standardized values of all other
outcome variables in the table. The sample excludes individuals who have missing
values for the dependent variables, and individuals for whom discounting type, or
level of IRR, are not unambiguous due to right-censoring in one or more time hori-
zons. Results are similar using weaker conditions for censoring, i.e., excluding only
if censored in two or more horizons. Robust standard errors in brackets; ***, **,*
indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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In the following we present a translation of the German instructions. Instructions were
presented to the interviewer on the screen of the laptop computer, and were read aloud to
the subjects by the interviewer.
Screen 1
Now that the interview is over we invite you to participate in a behavioral experiment,
which is important for economic science. The experiment involves nancial decisions,
which you can make in any way you want to. The questions are similar to those asked in
the questionnaire with the exception that THIS TIME YOU CAN EARN REAL MONEY!
I will rst explain the decision problem to you. Then you will make your decisions. A
chance move will then determine whether you actually earn money.
Every 7th participant wins!
HOW MUCH MONEY YOU WILL EARN AND AT WHICH POINT IN TIME WILL
DEPEND ON YOUR DECISIONS IN THE EXPERIMENT.
If you are among the winners, your amount will be paid by check. In this case the check
will be sent to you by post.
Screen 2
Participants were then shown a choice table for the respective experiment as an example.
The table was printed on a green piece of paper and was handed to participants for them
to study.
The experimenter continued explaining how the experiment would work.
The interviewer gave the following explanation:
In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between
 A xed amount of 100 Euro (column A \today")
 and a somewhat higher amount, which will be paid to you only \in 12 months"
(column B).
Payment \today" means that the check you get by post can be cashed immediately.
Payment \in 12 months" means that the check you get can be cashed only in 12 months.
You start with row 1 and then you go down from row to row. In each row you decide
between 100 Euro today (column A) and a higher amount (column B); please always keep
the timing of the payments in mind. The amount on the left side always remains the same,
only the amount on the right side increases from row to row.
Which row on one of the tables will be relevant for your earnings will be determined by a
random device later.
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As you can see, you can earn a considerable amount of money. Therefore, please carefully
consider your decisions.
Can we start now?
If the participant agreed, the experiment started. If not, the experimenter said the follow-
ing:
The experiment is the part of the interview where you can earn money! Are you sure that
you DO NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE?
If the participant still did not want to participate, the experiment was not conducted and
the participant answered a few nal questions. In case the subject wanted to participate
the experiment began.
Participants studied their table. The experimenter asked for the subject's decision in each
row, whether they preferred the option in Column A or B, starting with the rst row. In
case a participant preferred the higher, delayed amount the experimenter asked:
You have decided in favor of the higher amount of X in X months. We assume that this
implies that for all higher amounts you also prefer the later payment, meaning that for all
remaining rows all higher amounts will be selected (i.e., Column B).
If the participant did not agree, he kept on deciding between columns A and B.
Once the rst table was completed, the second table was presented to the participant. The
experimenter then said:
Now there is a second table. Please look at the table. You will do the same as before but
please note that the dates of payment and also the payments on the right side of the table
have changed.
For the second and third tables, the same procedure as with the rst table was followed.
When the tables were completed, participants were asked whether they had thought about
interest rates during the experiment and if so, which interest rate they had in mind and
whether they had compared this interest rate with those implied in the decision tables. They
were then asked what they would do with the 100 Euro from the experiment within the next
weeks. Alternative answers were, "spend everything", "spend most of the money and save
something", "save most of it and spend something" and "save everything", or "no reply".
Then it was determined whether the participant was among those who would be paid.
Participants could choose their "lucky number" between 1 and 7. They could then press
on one out of seven elds on the computer, which represented numbers from 1 to 7. If
they hit "their" number they won, otherwise they did not win. In case they won, it was
44determined which of the tables was selected and which row of the respective table. This
was done again by pressing on elds presented to participants on the computer screen. In
the end subjects who had won were informed that they would be sent the check by mail.
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